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 MERGING THE SOCIAL AND THE PUBLIC:  HOW 
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS COULD BE A NEW 
PUBLIC FORUM 
 
Amélie P. Heldt* 
 
Abstract 
When Facebook and other social media sites announced in 
August 2018 that they would ban extremist speakers, such as 
conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, for violating their rules against hate 
speech, reactions were strong.1 People either criticized the ban by 
saying that such measures were only a drop in the bucket with regard 
to toxic and harmful speech online, or they despised Facebook for 
penalizing only right-wing speakers, censoring political opinions and 
joining some type of anti-conservative media conglomerate.2 This 
anecdote foremost begged the question: should someone like Alex 
Jones be excluded from Facebook? Moreover, may Facebook exclude 
users for publishing political opinions? 
 As social media platforms take up more and more space in 
our daily lives, enabling not only individual and mass communication 
but also offering payment and other services, there is still a need for a 
common understanding regarding the social and communicative space 
social media platforms create in cyberspace. This common 
understanding is needed on a global scale since this is the way most 
social media platforms operate.3 While in the social science realm a 
new digital sphere was proclaimed4 and social media platforms can be 
                                                     
* Junior legal researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the Leibniz Institute for Media 
Research, Hamburg, associated researcher at the Humboldt-Institute for Internet and 
Society, Berlin and former visiting fellow with the Information Society Project at Yale 
Law School. I would like to thank Jack M. Balkin and Moran Yemini for their valuable 
feedback on the first version of this paper, as well as the participants of the 8th Young 
Comparatists Conference at McGill University School of Law and the participants of 
the Future Visions for a Democratic Internet Conference at UCD Sutherland School 
of Law. 
1 James Vincent, Facebook Removes Alex Jones Pages, Citing Repeated Hate Speech 
Violations, The Verge (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/6/17655102/facebook-bans-alex-jones-infowars-
pages [https://perma.cc/Q9BN-V244]. 
2 Id.; Robert H Lande & Chris Sagers, Who Should Conservatives Blame for Alex 
Jones’ Ban From Social Media? Themselves. Slate (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/08/donald-trump-and-conservatives-should-blame-
themselves-for-alex-jones-facebook-ban.html [https://perma.cc/9CJS-KVQP]; Paris 
Martineau, Facebook Bans Alex Jones, Other Extremists—but Not as Planned, Wired 
(2019) https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-bans-alex-jones-extremists 
[https://perma.cc/6AL2-UH4V]. 
3 See Facebook’s mission statement, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about 
[https://perma.cc/T8VU-XXA5]. 
4 Manuel Castells, The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication 
Networks, and Global Governance, 616 The Annals of the Am. Academy of Pol. & 
Soc. Science 78, 93 (2008). 
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categorized as “personal publics,”5 there is still no such denomination 
in legal scholarship that is globally agreed upon for social media.  
Public space can generally be defined as a free room between the 
state and society,6 a space for freedom. Generally, it is where 
individuals are protected by their fundamental rights while operating in 
the public sphere. However, terms like forum, space, and sphere may 
not be used as synonyms in this discussion. Under the First 
Amendment, the public forum doctrine mainly serves the purposes of 
democracy and truth and could be perpetuated in communication 
services that promote direct dialogue between the state and citizens.7 
But where and by whom is the public forum guaranteed in 
cyberspace? The notion of the public space in cyberspace is central, 
and it constantly evolves as platforms become broader in their 
services. Hence, it needs to be examined more closely. When looking 
at social media platforms, we need to take into account how they 
moderate speech and subsequently, how they influence social 
processes. If representative democracies are built on the grounds of 
deliberation, it is essential to safeguard the room for public discourse 
to actually happen.8 Are constitutional concepts for the analog space 
transferable into the digital? Should private actors such as social media 
platforms be bound by freedom of speech without being considered 
state actors?9 Accordingly, do they create a new type of public forum? 
The goal of this article is to provide answers to the questions 
mentioned. First, it will give an overview of the doctrinal concept of 
public forum doctrine in U.S. constitutional scholarship and its choke 
points related to cyberspace. Second, it will introduce the notion of 
“public” in German constitutional jurisprudence as a point of 
reference and the outcome of the comparative analysis. It will answer 
whether the public forum doctrine and the definition of “public” in 
Germany serve the same function in both systems, and, if so, how the 
doctrine needs to be taken into account by non-state actors. The focus 
will be on the consequences of this comparison for the digital sphere, 
                                                     
5 Jan-Hinrik Schmidt, Social Media 30 (2013). 
6 Klaus Eder, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie, in EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION 85–120 
(Markus Jachtenfuchs & Beate Kohler-Koch eds., 2003). 
7 Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2011). 
8 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE (1. ed. 1960); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: a 
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y. U. L. REV. 1, 
27. (2004); JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL 
INQUIRY 105 (Melvin L. Rogers ed., 2012). 
9 Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in Spheres of 
Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 487, 512 (2016); Kate Klonick, The 
New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 
HARV. L. REV 1598, 1658 (2018); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content 
Moderation, 106 GEO. L. J. 1353, 1386 (2018). 
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such as for the intermediaries that globally connect users and provide 
platforms to share content. The fundamental question is to which 
extent platforms can factually be the hosts of public discourse and at 
the same time enforce their own rules on the basis of their contractual 
relationship with users, such as moderating content. Gaining more 
clarity about these questions would serve the purpose of possibly 
revising our current expectations towards platforms, which are based 
on their role in modern society rather than on legal obligations. It 
would also show that judicial review can serve as a flexible tool if the 
doctrine is open to changes in society. Finally, this article proposes an 
extension of the public forum doctrine that would be based on the 
findings of the first parts and could serve as potential guidance to the 
courts that are applying the public forum doctrine in practice.  
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A. The Issue: The Public Forum Doctrine in Cyberspace 
Hardly any constitutional right has been in the public debate on 
the future of technology as much as freedom of speech. When social 
media platforms advocate for a connected world and more global 
communication, does the First Amendment favor or disfavor their 
users? Can the public forum doctrine still guarantee spaces where 
citizens enjoy their First Amendment rights in the digital age? The 
answer is: not really. While the First Amendment offers almost 
absolute protection against governmental intervention in analog state-
owned spaces, it fails to keep pace with the combined and increasing 
privatization and digitization of society. Coping with the fact that 
communication on the Internet mostly takes place on social media 
platforms and that these platforms offer their users some form of 
public sphere or place to exchange thoughts and viewpoints is a major 
challenge for First Amendment scholarship and the public forum 
doctrine.10  
Platforms are online services that “host and organize user content 
for public circulation, without having produced or commissioned it.”11 
Because they do not produce content but monitor and control the 
content generated by their users, platforms are also called 
intermediaries.12 It is this combination of intermediaries that connect 
users among each other and users who themselves become “prod-
users” of the platform’s content that makes this ecosystem special and 
complex. Traditional media enables public discourse by supplying 
curated content that fuels discussion among the audience. Sometimes 
print media will interact with its audience by allowing letters to the 
editor, but it remains a communicative one-way street. Via social 
media platforms, anyone can react, comment, share, and discuss—
without the boundaries of the offline world. 
This article attempts to provide an answer to the problem 
described by using functional comparison. In doing so, this paper 
offers a solution statement by analyzing how citizens can exercise their 
free speech rights in public spaces, in the U.S., and in the German 
context. The goal is to contribute to the debate on how to adapt the 
public forum doctrine to the needs of today’s communication 
                                                     
10 Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace Contents, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1117–18 (2005). 
11 Tarleton Gillespie, Governance of and by Platforms, SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA 254–1 (Jean Burgess, Thomas Poell & Alice Marweck eds., 2017). 
12 See id. at 3. 
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environment on an individual and societal level.13 To achieve that, we 
need to get a more granular sense of what is meant by “public” and to 
be more specific about our understanding of “public spaces” on social 
media platforms. Indeed, the word public can have different meanings 
and different normative effects according to the context.14 Part II 
describes the public forum doctrine and its limits in protecting speech 
in the digital sphere. Part III presents the notion of public in German 
constitutional scholarship and the takeaways of the comparative 
approach. Part IV is dedicated to the challenge of protecting speech 
online, while Part V offers a solution statement. 
B. What is “Public”? 
To avoid confusion, a brief introduction to the variations of the 
word “public” used in this article is necessary. When speaking of the 
public forum doctrine in U.S. constitutional law, this article will refer 
to it as “public forum.” The public forum doctrine does not include all 
places considered publicly accessible; instead, it has a restrictive 
conception of what is a public forum. Places that are accessible to or 
shared by all members of the community will be referred to as “public 
spaces.” “The Public” refers to the concept used by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) to describe places 
devoted to the general welfare (“Öffentlichkeit”). It is difficult to 
distinguish the different meanings of the word public in a clearer way 
because the terminology used in this area is so similar, and this 
similarity of the terms used is part of the problem described above. 
This article will, therefore, provide an overview of the U.S. public 
forum doctrine and its limits with regard to digital communication and 
conduct a functional comparison with German constitutional law. The 
result of the comparison will demonstrate that, in light of the heavy use 
of social media platforms, a doctrinal update of the public forum 
doctrine is necessary. Part of a more contemporary interpretation and 
suitable conceptualization of the public forum could be a new 
category, which this article calls the social public forum and which 
could be integrated into the current doctrinal model between the 
designated public forum and the nonpublic public forum.  
The term “public forum,” used for privileged speech protection 
under the First Amendment, is very similar to the German term 
“public” (“Öffentlichkeit”) as a space dedicated to the exchange of 
                                                     
13 Rikke Frank Jørgensen, When Private Actors Govern Human Rights, RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 346, 363 (Ben Wagner, 
Matthias C. Kettemann, & Kilian Vieth eds., 2019). 
14 Public, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public 
[https://perma.cc/WE6F-2YTE]. 
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information and opinions. However, their respective jurisprudence 
shows that not only the interpretation of freedom of speech differs 
between western democratic states15 but also that of the forum.16 A 
comparative approach can be helpful when identifying a doctrinal cul-
de-sac such as the challenge of applying the public forum doctrine in 
cyberspace. The FCC defined the notion of “Public” as follows: “[i]t is 
characterized by the fact that a multitude of different activities and 
concerns can be pursued in it, creating a versatile and open network of 
communication.”17 In its ensuing decision, the FCC made it clear that 
privately-owned but publicly-accessible spaces cannot evade a human 
rights protection of speech and social actions.18 The FCC partly based 
its definition on ISKCON v. Lee.19 And yet, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a publicly accessible yet privately-owned terminal is not such a 
public forum.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the societal importance of 
the Internet in Reno v. ACLU20 and of social media platforms in 
Packingham v. North Carolina,21 but only insofar as the State was not 
allowed to restrict access to such services. Calling social networks 
“essential venues for public gatherings”22 does not provide sufficient 
guidance on how to handle the power private actors have over these 
“venues.” Recent cases such as Prager University v. Google,23 Knight 
Institute v. Trump,24 and Davison v. Randall25 have shown that we need 
a more granular understanding of social media platforms in relation to 
the communicative space they create. It is so far unclear to what extent 
newsfeeds, profiles, and groups can be treated the same way under the 
doctrine, although their functionalities and settings differ.26  
II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITS 
                                                     
15 Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 
1225 (1999). 
16 ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 199 (1995). 
17 BVerfGE, 128, 226, 253. 
18 BVerfG, July 18, 2015 - 1 BvQ 25/15. 
19 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992). 
20 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
21 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
22 Id. at 1735. 
23 Prager Univ. v. Google LLC., No. 19-CV-340667, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034 
(Super. Ct. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019). 
24 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 
2019). 
25 Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). 
26 Moran Yemini, Missing in “State Action”: Toward a Pluralist Conception of the First 
Amendment, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149 (2019). 
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A. The Public Forum Doctrine 
This brief overview of the public forum doctrine within First 
Amendment theory provides a basis for the discussion around the 
problem of speech on social media platforms. It can by no means 
reflect the many layers and nuances of a doctrine that was developed 
through extensive jurisprudence and scholarship. However, a basic 
understanding of its main features and its limits is a prerequisite for 
this article’s argument. Through its negative formulation, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,”27 the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the Bill of Rights has a 
broad scope of protection for the rights enshrined, namely the 
freedoms of speech and assembly. Regulatory interventions by the 
state are supposed to be kept as minimal as possible in order to 
preserve the marketplace of ideas, a place of deliberation and public 
discourse in which the most valid ideas will prevail. This protection 
from governmental intervention also touches on the physical location 
of the speaker—the public forum doctrine was developed to define 
where citizens could exercise their right to use public spaces for 
communication.28 If the expressive activity occurs on a government-
owned property, the level of First Amendment protection depends on 
the type of space.29 Not all public spaces are per se public forums with 
the highest protection of free speech. Instead, according to the 
doctrine of the Supreme Court, only traditional and designated public 
forums will be protected from regulation by means of scrutiny.  
1. Traditional and Designated Public Forum 
The public forum doctrine was developed by the Court to 
guarantee First Amendment rights in spaces that “have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”30 These spaces 
ought to be protected from regulatory intervention in communicative 
activities in the strongest way. In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry 
Educators’ Ass’n,31 the Court developed three types of public forums, 
limiting the use of the public property for expressive purpose when 
                                                     
27 U.S. CONST. amend. I (hereinafter First Amendment). 
28 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
29 ALLAN IDES, CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & SIMONA GROSSI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 424 (Seventh ed. 2016). 
30 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. 
31 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
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not a traditional or designated public forum.32 A traditional public 
forum is a public facility that has, by long tradition, been dedicated to 
“the free exchange of ideas.”33 This category includes public parks, 
sidewalks, and areas that have been traditionally open to political 
speech and debate.34 The state is only allowed to enforce a content-
based exclusion if its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.35 It may also 
enforce content-neutral regulation with regard to time, space, and 
manner of the place’s use,36 such as opening hours or other reasonable 
restrictions on the use of public property.37  
The same applies to the second doctrinal category: the so-called 
designated public forum. It “consists of public property which the state 
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”38 
Designated public forums enjoy the same level of protection as 
traditional ones, but they will only be a public forum according to the 
doctrine if the state chooses to open the property for expressive 
activity for part or all of the public.39 Furthermore, the state is not 
obliged to keep the designated forum open as such.40 Examples of a 
designated public forum are a seminar room in a public university or a 
municipal theatre.  
The third category—limited public forum—can be described as a 
subcategory of designated public forums, since it is designated for 
expressive activities by “certain groups” or for “discussion of certain 
subjects.”41 Here, the government may reserve the forum for certain 
groups or the discussion of certain topics, but the restriction must not 
discriminate against speech based on viewpoint and must be 
reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose.42 It is not strictly content-
neutral but should not restrict speakers on the basis of their opinion. 
                                                     
32 ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2005). 
33 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800–02 (1985). 
34 See id. 
35 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).  
36 U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981). 
37 DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 805 (Daniel A. Farber et al. eds., 
5th ed. 2013). 
38 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
39 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Government Sponsored Social Media and Public Forum 
Doctrine Under the First Amendment: Perils and Pitfalls, 19 UF PUB. L. 2, 4. 
40 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
41 Id. 
42 Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 99 (2001). 
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2. Spaces on the Edge or Outside 
Spaces that are neither a traditional nor a designated public 
forum, but government-owned, can be a nonpublic forum. According 
to the Court, in a nonpublic forum the government may restrict the 
content of speech, as long as the restriction is reasonable and the 
restriction does not discriminate based on speakers’ viewpoints.43 A 
nonpublic forum is “one that has not traditionally been open to the 
public, where opening it to expressive conduct would ‘somehow 
interfere with the objective use and purpose to which the property has 
been dedicated.’”44 Hence, any regulation that goes beyond time, 
space, or manner will be subject to a lower scrutiny than in the other 
types of forum mentioned above. In Good News Club v. Milford, the 
Court held that “it may be justified in reserving its forum for certain 
groups or the discussion of certain topics. The power to restrict 
speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not 
discriminate against speech based on viewpoint and must be 
reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose.”45 
Finally, some public property is not a public forum at all and thus 
is not subject to this forum analysis. For example, public television 
broadcasters are not subject to the forum analysis when they decide 
what shows to air. In sum, for a space to be “a public meeting place for 
open discussion,” it needs to meet various requirements. Additionally, 
it must be a government-owned property space traditionally dedicated 
to the free exchange of ideas or dedicated to this purpose by the 
government. 46 Ultimately, it is a governmental decision as to whether a 
place shall be such a public forum and accordingly to decide whether 
the government will be allowed to regulate speech or not.47 Apart from 
the ancient agora or forum, hardly any space in the public sphere only 
serves the purpose of dialogue. Government property generally serves 
other public purposes like education, trade, and security, which can 
always be preferred when it comes to the purpose the special entity is 
primarily dedicated to. This was proven true by decisions of the Court 
on facilities like jails or military bases.48  
                                                     
43 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 49; see generally Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. 
Ct. 1876 (2018). 
44 Warren v. Fairfax Cty., 196 F.3d 186, 190–91 (4th Cir. 1999). 
45 Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 99 (2001). 
46 Forum, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forum 
[https://perma.cc/B752-6Y3C]. 
47 See Lidsky, supra note 7, at 2012. 
48 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976). 
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Because of this, the public forum doctrine has a restrictive effect 
on free speech.49 This is partly due to the inconsistent approach the 
Court has taken and it is leading to one result—narrowing down the 
scope of what is considered a public forum. Although the primary 
function of the public forum doctrine is to guarantee spaces where one 
may enjoy their freedom of speech, it is factually restricting speakers in 
their choice of place. As demonstrated so far, traditional and 
designated forums are by no means the dominant category of public 
forums nowadays (in terms of share), especially when we think of the 
increasing privatization of property (which will be examined below). If 
the status of a traditional or designated public forum is accorded only a 
limited number of spaces, the doctrine has—to a certain extent—and 
will increasingly have a restrictive effect on freedom of speech.  
B. Not So Public? 
Private property is not considered a public forum and private 
parties are not subject to the First Amendment’s protections for free 
speech, leaving it to the owner’s discretion to what extent a property 
can be used for expressive purposes. The relationship (contractual or 
not50) between the owner and the user of the property is exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny unless the private owner is considered a 
state actor—a status which can be attributed to the owner by a court 
according to the state action doctrine. The state action doctrine has a 
long tradition in Court jurisprudence and constitutional scholarship. In 
this article, the state action doctrine can and shall only be summarized 
briefly accordingly to the scope of the problem—its intertwinement 
with the public forum doctrine. Indeed, the overlap of both is crucial 
for the understanding of the argument above. The public forum 
doctrine can have an even more restrictive effect on free speech if its 
application on private parties is minor although the public sphere 
becomes increasingly private. Scholars have been warning about this 
trend since the 1990s,51 and although the fear expressed back then did 
not fully become reality, the discussion is ongoing on a global scale.52 
                                                     
49 Hereinafter, the word speech is used to refer to protected and non-commercial 
speech. It might, in certain cases, be non-verbal when speakers use pictures or videos to 
express their opinions, but this paper will essentially look at non-symbolic speech.  
50 Whether governed by an agreement in a formal sense or any other form of consensus.  
51 MICHAEL SORKIN, VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND 
THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE (1992). 
52 Judit Bodnar, Reclaiming Public Space, 52 URBAN STUD. 2090 (2015). 
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1. Can There Be a Public Forum Owned by a Private Party? 
Under the state action doctrine, private parties are exempt from 
applying third-party fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights.53 The rationale behind the state action doctrine is to preserve 
private autonomy, leaving the relationship between private parties 
immune to the application of the Constitution.54 Private parties may 
only be subject to the same obligations as the government if they fall 
under the public function or the entanglement exception. In its 
landmark case of Marsh v. Alabama, the Court declared that a 
company-town was a state actor under the public function exception, 
which resulted in the protection of speech on the company-town’s 
streets as in any other city, with the following reasoning: “[m]any 
people in the United States live in company-owned towns . . . . [t]here 
is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for 
curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.”55 In 
Jackson v. Edison Co., the Court restricted the public function 
exception to activities that had been traditionally carried out 
exclusively by the state.56 Later, it defined the “entanglement 
constellation” as a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the 
challenged action of the (private) entity so that the action of the latter 
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.57  
In these two cases, the private actor can be treated as a state actor 
and, in the context of the First Amendment, can be subject to the 
scrutiny of traditional or designated public forums. The courts need to 
perform a detailed inquiry to determine if a private actor meets the 
test.58 However, the Court’s broad interpretation of a state actor in 
Marsh v. Alabama was unique in its kind, and one should refrain from 
applying the company-town analogy to other private properties used 
for expressive activities.59 In no other case has the Court expanded 
governmental principles to that extent to a private actor—a 
development for which it has been largely criticized, not least because 
its jurisprudence in that question is considered inconsistent.60  
                                                     
53 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
54 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 524 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
55 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
56 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
57 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1536 (8th ed. 2018); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 529. 
58 STONE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1536; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 529. 
59 STONE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1574. 
60 Charles L. Black Jr., Foreword:" State Action," Equal Protection and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV 69, 95 (1967); Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State 
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Indeed, the Court has been reluctant to widen the scope of 
application to private spaces both in the analog and the digital world.61 
This goes in the opposite direction of an increasing privatization over 
the past decades: from the company-town (Marsh v. Alabama), to 
restricted public spaces within private property in big cities (e.g., New 
York City zoning resolutions62) to private shopping malls (Lloyd v. 
Tanner), public life is no longer happening in solely traditional public 
spaces like streets, sidewalks, and parks.63 The consequences of this 
development on freedom of speech are substantial, and this article 
shall look at them more closely after clarifying how to classify a space 
that is not considered a traditional or designated public forum.  
2. Spaces Designed for Shopping, Not Speaking 
The First Amendment does not apply to privately-owned spaces 
unless the space meets either the public function or entanglement test 
under the state action doctrine.64 If the privately-owned space meets 
either of those tests, it must fulfill the same obligations as a state-owned 
space.65 Private owners may dispose of their property as they wish 
(while still respecting the law) and exclude any third-party from 
trespassing or using the property for expressive use.66 If a right to enter 
the property is granted to the general public (because of commercial 
activity, for example), this permission does not implicitly grant a right 
to use it beyond the intent of the private owner as a public forum.67  
                                                     
Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 79, 
80 (2003). 
61 Space (public or private) is intended to mean the physical space, distinguished from 
the term “sphere” which is sometimes used interchangeably but in fact refers to a social 
concept. The agora as the public sphere can and traditionally does take place in a public 
space but does not need to.  
62 Stephen Tower, Not In My Front Yard: Freedom of Speech and State Action In 
New York City’s Privately Owned Public Spaces, 22 J. L. & Pol'y 476, 480 (2014); Jerold 
S. Kayden, Privately Owned Public Space: The New York City Experience (2000). 
63 John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C.L. 
Rev. 569, 609 (2004). 
64 Id. at 583–85 (referring to the tests as “government function” and “nexus,” 
respectively). See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) 
(finding Amtrak served a government function because it furthered government 
objectives, for which it was statutorily created, and was subject to government control); 
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 399 (2001) 
(finding entanglement when State Board members sat on the Association’s committees 
and Association’s ministerial employees were treated as state employees). 
65 Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, 
and the Promise of Pruneyard Note, 13 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 533, 543 (2004). 
66 Private owners are also protected under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
from eminent domain without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
67 See Mulligan, supra note 65, at 551. 
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Shopping malls are a good example of a space open to the 
general public but privately-owned and not subject to First 
Amendment rights. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Court ruled that 
shopping malls were not public forums and that protesters did not 
enjoy the right to express themselves under the First Amendment 
therein.68 They may “very well function as de facto urban centers, they 
do not take over the function of the city square.”69 The owner may 
restrict the use for expressive purposes in the same way she can 
exercise any other property rights.70 Opening a private property to the 
general public does not come with the obligation to guarantee freedom 
of speech (except in cases of state action), marking a clear separation 
between private and public space in relation to the freedom of 
speech.71  
However, this strict separation of public and private spaces can 
have negative effects according to the First Amendment rationale—to 
enable as much speech as possible.72 Enabling as much speech as 
possible might not be necessarily commendable for the purposes of 
freedom of speech, but it has been the steady interpretation of the 
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.73 Not only should content-
based governmental intervention be restricted to the minimum, but 
the chilling effect of other non-governmental measures should be a 
concern as well.74  
C. From Shopping Malls to Cyberspace 
The question of how to balance the protection of private 
property and free speech has become even more urgent since 
digitization. In Denver Area v. Federal Communications Commission, 
Justice Kennedy stressed the importance of adapting the existing 
doctrine to the challenges of new facts: “[w]hen confronted with a 
threat to free speech in the context of an emerging technology, we 
ought to have the discipline to analyze the case by reference to existing 
elaborations of constant First Amendment principles.”75 If television 
                                                     
68 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1971). 
69 Bodnar, supra note 52, at 2097. 
70 Mulligan, supra note 65, at 551. 
71 Tanner, 407 U.S. at 569–70. 
72 Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now Symposium: The Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 255, 277 (1992); Fee, supra note 63, at 609. 
73 Sunstein, supra note 72.  
74 Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and 
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
101, 124 (2004). 
75 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).  
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stations are deemed non-state actors, they can limit free speech.76 This 
was recently confirmed in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. 
Halleck.77 The Court held that private entities running public access 
channels were not state actors, and therefore not subject to the 
constraints imposed on state action by the First Amendment.78 This 
decision was expected to deliver guidance on how to deal with social 
media platforms.79 Although the Court strictly stuck to the television 
channel’s case, one could interpret the ruling as a step away from 
possibly subsuming social media platforms under the state action 
doctrine. This would subsequently mean that they could not be 
considered public forums under the current doctrine.  
While the Internet enables communication at a larger scale, it 
has, at the same time, fostered new, private gatekeepers with unseen 
powers over public communication.80 Social media platforms and other 
intermediaries are on the one hand aiming at providing a service of 
communication and information (“bringing the world closer 
together”81), but they also impose the strict rules under which this 
communication process is allowed. They represent the main speech 
infrastructure online and may restrict the platform’s use in accordance 
with the rights of a private owner to do so.82 What cannot be forbidden 
in a public forum because of the broad protection under the Free 
Speech Clause can be banned because of the private nature of the 
relationship between users and platforms.83 This matter has been 
raised by scholars before, although it has, until recently, rather been 
perceived as a positive effect for free speech, namely the ultimate 
remedy from government interference.84 The dilemma of the First 
Amendment can be summarized as follows: in cyberspace, 
communication platforms are not public forums since cyberspace is in 
                                                     
76 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019). 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1934.  
79 Colin Lecher, First Amendment Constraints Don’t Apply to Private Pplatforms, 
Supreme Court Affirms, THE VERGE (June 17, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/17/18682099/supreme-court-ruling-first-
amendment-social-media-public-forum [https://perma.cc/T29C-3BAY]. 
80 Philip M. Napoli, Social Media and the Public Interest: Governance of News 
Platforms in the Realm of Individual and Algorithmic Gatekeepers, 39 TELECOMM. 
POL’Y 751, 757 (2015). 
81 See Facebook’s mission statement, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about 
[https://perma.cc/T8VU-XXA5]. 
82 Luca Belli & Jamila Venturini, Private Ordering and the Rise of Terms of Service as 
Cyber-Regulation, IPR (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/private-ordering-and-rise-terms-service-cyber-
regulation [https://perma.cc/CG63-7A4M]. 
83 Id.  
84 Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 88 (2003). 
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its structure mostly privately owned, leaving it to each platform’s 
discretion to what extent it will provide a space for free speech. 85 
This does not mean that the Court does not recognize the 
importance of the Internet in today’s communication structure. In fact, 
in Reno v. ACLU and Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court 
asserted the great importance of online services and having access to 
them. In the first case, the Court stated that First Amendment rights 
were applicable in the context of communications undertaken via the 
Internet and called cyberspace the “vast democratic forums of the 
Internet.”86 Packingham v. North Carolina confirmed the importance 
of cyberspace for the First Amendment and for social media in 
particular.87 However, the Court has been reluctant to apply the state 
action doctrine to private parties in general,88 which makes it unlikely 
that the providers of online communication infrastructure will be 
considered state actors.89 The prevailing opinion is that—according to 
the principles and the wording of the First Amendment—only the 
government needs to be watched when it comes to the speech-related 
interventions, not social media platforms.90 As non-state actors, the 
latter are free to define the terms of use of their service (including 
communicating by means of sharing, tweeting, and messaging), just like 
any private party offering services to the general public.91 
A competing school of thought pushes a more affirmative and 
speech-protective role of the government, declaring that the 
government ought to set the conditions of the digital marketplace of 
ideas in order for it to serve democratic values.92 This would underline 
                                                     
85 Nunziato, supra note 10, at 1125; Jacquelyn Fradette, Online Terms of Service: A 
Shield for First Amendment Scrutiny of Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
947, 957 (2014). 
86 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997); IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 398. 
87 Packingham v.  North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
88 STONE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1578; IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 18. 
89 Nunziato, supra note 10, at 1130; MORAN YEMINI, FREE SPEECH FOR ALL: A JUSTICE-
INFUSED THEORY OF SPEECH FOR THE DIGITAL ECOSYSTEM (2017); Langvardt, supra 
note 9, at 1366; Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST 
AMENDMENT INSTITUTE: EMERGING THREATS SERIES (2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/5d8a0f848d/Is-the-First-
Amendment-Obsolete-.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EE9-U4GZ]. 
90 Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of 
Applying Constitutional Norms to Private Regulation Symposium - Part IV: How (If at 
All) to Regulate the Internet, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1266 (2000). 
91 Id. 
92 See Cass R. Sunstein, State Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 465, 469 
(2002); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 964 (2nd ed. 1988); 
Nunziato, supra note 10, at 1143–44; Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making 
Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. JL & TECH. 149 
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the democracy-based theories of free speech,93 making cyberspace 
eventually indispensable for our democratic culture and system.94 This 
position does not, by any means, represent the prevailing opinion 
among First Amendment scholars, partly because this school relies 
more on free speech values than on First Amendment rights. 
Generally speaking, values and rights do not conflict with each other, 
as the values conveyed by the First Amendment are obviously 
overlapping with the rights enshrined. They are, however, technically 
not the same because the interpretation of the First Amendment is 
broader than its wording. The jurisprudence and the scholarship 
around free speech have contributed to the development of our First 
Amendment understanding—such as the public forum doctrine—and 
are as much part of this fundamental right as the wording.  
It is also important to note that there is no absolute consensus on 
the issue of a more affirmative interpretation of the First Amendment 
protection. As stated by Dawn Nunziato: “[t]o remedy this problem, 
we need to introduce spaces in which individuals’ free speech is 
constitutionally protected instead of leaving the protection of free 
speech at the mercy of private speech regulators.”95 One way could be 
to reevaluate the “traditionality” component of the traditional public 
forum doctrine as Nunziato suggests. Nunziato argues for a 
reinterpretation by the courts; courts could intervene on the state level 
and interpret their respective constitutions’ free speech clause.96 This 
would detach the subsuming of a public forum as traditional from the 
restrictive jurisprudence. Courts could also try to reinterpret standards 
of the traditional public forum such as the “principal and historical 
purpose” and the “unfettered access,” but as long as the standards stay 
as such, there will be no contemporary (and yet) traditional public 
forum.97 
The preceding section shows that the public forum doctrine is 
supposed to guarantee each citizen a space to express thoughts, ideas, 
and criticism, which cannot be restricted by the government beyond 
neutral time, space, and manner rules. Due to the broad scope of 
protection of the Free Speech Clause, this shall only apply to public 
property under certain conditions and not to private property where 
owners have the right to govern the use of their property for expressive 
                                                     
(1998); Ari Ezra Waldman, Durkheim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online 
Society, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 345, 420 (2013). 
93 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8.  
94 Balkin, supra note 8, at 32. 
95 Nunziato, supra note 10, at 1161. 
96 Id. at 1166–67; see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
97 IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 426. 
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conduct.98 This, in turn, has substantial effects on communication in 
the digital sphere, which underlines this article’s argument that the 
public forum doctrine has a restrictive effect as far as traditional public 
forums diminish de facto. What is the way to go, if the categories 
above will not allow adequate protection of speech in the context of 
social media platforms and if the components and standards of 
traditional doctrine do not leave room for a contemporary 
application?99 Cass Sunstein called for a “reevaluation in the light of 
free speech principles” which shall be the guiding principle for the 
comparative analysis below.100 
III. THE PUBLIC FORUM IN GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Germany and the U.S. are often used as cases in comparative 
constitutional law since their respective principles of protecting 
freedom of speech are quite divergent.101 The First Amendment offers 
broad protection from the coercive power of the state as described 
above, while the German concept of freedom of speech is more 
affirmative and a less general proviso. The main difference between 
the two is that the limits of free speech in Germany are stipulated in 
Article 5 (2) Basic Law.102 According to this law, the government is 
allowed to restrict speech in a content-based manner under specific 
circumstances.103 The First Amendment, on the other hand, precisely 
forbids this type of law because it would potentially restrict an 
individual’s freedom of expression.104 Thus, concepts cannot be 
transferred from one legal system to another without certain 
adaptations. They can nevertheless contribute mutually helpful 
elements when dealing with the same issue, such as defining 
proportionate rules for new types of communication. The scholarship 
in this area is large and touches on the interpretations of both 
constitutional courts on the limits of free speech. Free speech, of 
course, has to do with the foundations of each constitution and the 
respective cultures of both countries.105 The Free Speech Clauses of the 
                                                     
98 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). 
99 See Michael L. Taviss, Dueling Forums: The Public Forum Doctrine’s Failure to 
Protect the Electronic Forum Editorial Comment, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 757, 778 (1991). 
100 Sunstein, supra note 72. 
101 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1279; Winfried Brugger, Ban On or Protection Of Hate 
Speech-Some Observations Based on German and American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & 
CIV. LF 1 (2002). 
102 The German Basic Law is equivalent to a constitution and treated as such.  
103 See Art. 5 (2) Basic Law. 
104 See supra note 27, the First Amendment.  
105 Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some 
Comparative Observations Essay, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 435 (2002); Claudia E. Haupt, 
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First Amendment and of Article 5(1) Basic Law can therefore not be 
compared without further analysis.  
Under Article 5(1) Basic Law “[e]very person shall have the right 
freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and 
pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally 
accessible sources. . . . There shall be no censorship.”106 This includes 
the right to choose where and how to express his opinions.107 The limits 
to these rights are set in Article 5(2) Basic Law: “[t]hese rights shall 
find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the 
protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor.”108 
Such general laws include property law, which is relevant to the 
question of the public forum analyzed here. There is no direct 
equivalent in German constitutional law to the U.S. public forum 
doctrine, which confirms the functional method to look for an 
equivalent concept fulfilling a similar task.109 Based on the functional 
principle, namely: “[t]he incomparable cannot be meaningfully 
compared, and comparable in law is only what fulfills the same task, 
the same function.”110 The objective here is to find an equivalent to the 
U.S. public forum in the jurisprudence of the FCC111 and, by pointing 
out similarities and differences between both, to find an approach to 
the problem of the public doctrine in cyberspace. 
A. The “Public” 
There is no direct equivalent of the public forum doctrine in 
German constitutional law. Instead, a space in which the speaker can 
                                                     
Regulating Hate Speech - Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don’t: Lessons 
Learned from Comparing the German and US Approaches, 23 BU INT’L LJ 299, 300 
(2005). 
106 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] Jul. 11, 2012, 
art. 5, § 1 (Ger.). Official translation by: Professor Christian Tomuschat and Professor 
David P. Currie.  
107 Franz Schemmer, GG Art. 5 [Recht der freien Meinungsäußerung], BECKOK 
GRUNDGESETZ 9 (Volker Epping & Christian Hillgruber eds., 37 ed. 2018). 
108 GG Jul. 11, 2012, art. 5 § 2. 
109 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1238; Francesca Bignami, Formal Versus Functional 
Method in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 442, 464 (2016); 
Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 368, 381 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006); UWE KISCHEL, RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 93 (2015); Mark 
Van Hoecke, Methodology of Comparative Research, LAW AND METHOD 9 (2015). 
110 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG: 
AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS 33 (3., neubearb. Aufl. ed. 1996). 
111 The Federal Constitutional Court, in German: Bundesverfassungsgericht, is the 
highest court in Germany, but strictly limited to constitutional matters and not an 
appellate court in other matters.  
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choose to speak free from governmental intervention is “the Public,”112 
which in general refers to an area of people seen as a whole, in which 
something has become generally known and accessible to all.113 Legally 
speaking, “public” means a place where individuals need to respect the 
law but are, at the same time, protected by fundamental rights from 
unjustified law enforcement or any restrictive action by the state that is 
not covered by constitutional proviso.114  
The Public, as defined by the FCC, fulfills the function of a 
public forum but is not limited to the rights enshrined in Article 5(1) 
Basic Law, such as freedom of speech or the freedom to assemble.115 
The Public (as a translation of the concept of “Öffentlichkeit”) is 
closely related to the concept of the public sphere in social science, 
which is the space in which the formation of public opinion takes 
place.116 According to Habermas, the public sphere is “a network for 
communicating information and points of view.”117 Although Habermas 
himself warned against equating the Public and the public sphere,118 the 
notion of Public cannot be perceived without the element of people 
gathering to exchange ideas and thoughts, and therefore participating 
in the public discourse. The Public can also be summarized as a free 
room between the state and society, a space for freedom.119 This article 
will take a closer look at the Public as a space for communication 
below.  
Even though the public is a space in which citizens will mostly 
enjoy their “societal” freedom (the freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
voting) it is not strictly limited to the latter in German constitutional 
law. Instead, the public allows all rights the citizen owns to be 
protected from the power of the state. The freedoms of movement, of 
informational self-determination, of religious belief, of the protection 
of the family, of property, and of profession are granted as well. 
Hence, the Public can, as well, be defined by delimiting it from private 
                                                     
112 The Public as translated from “die Öffentlichkeit.” 
113 Translated from Die Öffentlichkeit als Gesamtheit gesehener Bereich von Menschen, 
in dem etwas allgemein bekannt [geworden] und allen zugänglich ist., 
https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Oeffentlichkeit [https://perma.cc/KG53-
GG2F]. 
114 See, e.g., Art. 5 (2) Basic Law. 
115 See supra notes 17–18. 
116 Jurgen Habermas, Sara Lennox & Frank Lennox, The Public Sphere: An 
Encyclopedia Article (1964), NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 49 (1974); Zizi Papacharissi, 
The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere, 4 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 9, 10 
(2002). 
117 JÜRGEN HABERMAS & WILLIAM REHG, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 360 (1996). 
118 Id. at 49. 
119 Eder, supra note 6, at 85. 
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spaces which will, on the contrary, be governed by the owner’s rights. 
Its relationship with third parties will be based on some type of 
consensus: contractual or quasi-contractual nature (culpa in 
contrahendo, if preliminary to a contract). 
B. The “Public” as a Space for Deliberation 
Without using the Public as a synonym for the public sphere, the 
notion is still closely connected to the use of public spaces in order to 
participate in societal activities, such as the formation of public 
opinion.120 To serve this purpose the Public is protected—amongst 
other laws—by Article 5(1) Basic Law. The close relationship between 
the scope of protection of free speech and the concept of Public is 
best explained by a concrete example. The Fraport decision 
demonstrates the close link between the legal and the social concepts 
of the public in the FCC’s jurisprudence.121 The FCC’s holdings are 
particularly clear in this decision, showing that the FCC leans on the 
societal function of public spaces to define them as public.122 In the 
Fraport decision, the FCC sets its standards for public communication, 
a truly remarkable decision, striking in its clarity regarding the risks 
inherent to privatization and its outlook with regard to digitization.  
1. The FCC’s Fraport Ruling 
 The defendant in Fraport was a company operating the airport 
of Frankfurt, the Fraport AG.123 It had prohibited a demonstration in 
the airport’s terminal.124 The latter was publicly accessible, as it was 
open to the general public without any security check and hosted 
various stores and services, similar to a shopping mall.125 The 
complainant was the organizer of a demonstration against deportation 
at the Frankfurt airport,126 and her complaint was directed at the 
judgments of the civil courts affirming a ban, which prevented her 
                                                     
120 Habermas et al., supra note 117, at 50. 
121 Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 22, 2011, 1 
BvR 699 (Ger.), 
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20110222_1bvr069906en.html [https://perma.cc/GMS7-
7XRS]. 
122 Id. at para. 72. 
123 Frankfurt is the biggest airport in Germany and considered an international hub. The 
Fraport AG is a stock corporation, majority-owned by the state, which was the first 
question the FCC had to clarify in this case. Id. at para. 2. The FCC, however, stated 
that whether the company was considered publicly owned or not did not matter for the 
question of the public as a forum. Id. at paras. 51–52. 
124 Id. at para. 10. 
125 Id. at para. 3. 
126 Id. at para 9. 
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from using the airport for expressing her opinion and for 
demonstrations without the Fraport AG’s permission.127 The FCC 
ruled in favor of the complainant, arguing that a space such as an 
airport terminal represented a public forum and was therefore subject 
to the freedoms of speech and assembly set out in Article 5(1) and 8(1) 
Basic Law.128  
In its decision, the FCC referred to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
holding that “[t]he question of whether such a place that is located 
outside public streets and places can be deemed a public space for 
communication can be answered according to the concept of the 
public forum.”129 The FCC cited two decisions by the Supreme Court 
of Canada and the U.S. Supreme Court as “examples” for “similar 
criteria.”130 It did not endorse the U.S. public forum doctrine, but 
rather mentioned it as one possibility to define the Public as a forum 
in the broader sense. The FCC used the foreign rulings to underline 
its traditional case law on the protection of the Public and its use for 
public opinion.131 This detour seems almost unnecessary, especially in 
light of its constant jurisprudence on the horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights.132 However, it showed that the FCC is attentive to 
foreign jurisprudence, especially when it comes to fundamental 
questions for German society. 
The FCC justified its positive answer to the question “of whether 
such a place . . . can be deemed a public space for communication . . 
.”133 by emphasizing the role that private companies assume when 
taking over “the provision of public communications and thus assume 
functions which were previously allocated to the state as part of its 
services of general interest.”134 By way of analogy to the “public street 
space,” the FCC concluded that a public space for communication is a 
place “open to public traffic and where places of general 
                                                     
127 Id. at para. 2. 
128 Id. at paras. 98–99, 105–06.  
129 Id. at para. 70. 
130 Id.; see Supreme Court of Canada: Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. 
Canada, 1 S. C. R. 139 (1991); Supreme Court of the United States: Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee , 505 U.S. 672 (1992). 
131 See Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 14, 
1985, 1 BvR 233 (Ger.), https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=70 
[https://perma.cc/X9N3-GUCR]; Michael Kniesel, Die Versammlungs- und 
Demonstrationsfreiheit - Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen und 
versammlungsgesetzliche Konkretisierung, NJW 857, 861 (1992).  
132 Jan Philipp Schaefer, Neues vom Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit - 
Gewährleistungsverwaltung nach dem Fraport-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts., 
51 DER STAAT 251, 276 (2012). 
133 1 BverfG 699, at para. 70. 
134 Id. at para. 59; see also Versammlungsfreiheit im Flughafen, 2011 NJW 1201, 1204 
(2011). 
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communication develop.”135 The public street space is “the natural 
forum that citizens have used historically to express their concerns 
especially effectively in public and to thus prompt communication.”136 
It expanded this concept to places outside public streets, stating that “a 
public forum is characterized by the fact that it can be used to pursue a 
variety of different activities and concerns leading to the development 
of a varied and open communications network.”137 According to the 
FCC, once space is made available for communicative uses, “political 
debate in the form of collective expressions of opinion through 
assemblies” may not be excluded from it.138 It concluded this type of 
space was “the basis for the democratic formation of will and a 
constitutive element of the democratic governmental order.”139 
The FCC emphasized the structural function of the Public for 
representative democracies and therefore based its definition on 
whether or not it was open to public traffic and to communicative 
activities.140 It was not decisive whether the government had 
traditionally opened airport terminals for expressive purposes or 
designated them as such.141 On the contrary, it stressed that if a 
property owner opened her space to the general public, she could not 
limit the communicative activities of the people entering this space.142 
The defendant argued that the airport terminal was different from the 
traditional public street space because the shops and services only 
served the main purpose of the space, which was to be an airport.143 
The FCC clearly pushed back on this argument, which could 
potentially be a loophole for similar cases.144 By doing so, it shifted the 
definition of “the Public” from state-owned to a space defined by de 
facto communicative use.145  
2. A Horizontal Effect in Privately-Owned Spaces 
The Fraport decision is special because the FCC expressed the 
need to protect the freedoms of speech and assembly beyond the 
boundaries of classical public spaces, expanding the protection of 
Articles 5 and 8 Basic Law to spaces considered “public” due to the 
                                                     
135 Versammlungsfreiheit im Flughafen, 2011 NJW at 1204. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1205. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 1 BVerfG 699, at para. 70. 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Id. at para. 36. 
144 Id. at paras. 68–70. 
145 Id. at para. 70. 
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way citizens would use them for communicative purposes.146 This 
decision is also relevant in light of the horizontal effect on fundamental 
rights.147 This principle was established in an early landmark decision of 
the FCC, in which it stated that fundamental rights may come into 
effect between private parties if the court of lower instance did not 
sufficiently observe the fundamental rights of a party when deciding its 
verdict.148 Although fundamental rights primarily serve the purpose of 
defending citizens against the state, they may under certain 
circumstances come to affect private parties via the verdict of a court.149 
The horizontal effect is highly relevant to the question of public 
forums: if private property is accessible to the general public and 
meets the requirements above, it can potentially be subject to similar 
obligations as the state. In addition to the Fraport ruling, the FCC 
explicitly addressed the issue of privately-owned spaces in two recent 
decisions and confirmed the above.  
In the first case (“Bierdosenflashmob”), the FCC decided that a 
privately owned but publicly accessible square in the city center could 
be part of the Public as defined above and could therefore be a space 
for communication and assembly, regardless of the fact that it was 
privately owned.150 As a result, the owner had to allow a demonstration 
even if there was no substantive link between the square and the cause 
of the demonstration. The complainant did not need to prove she 
could only achieve her expressive purpose when demonstrating on 
that specific square. The decision mostly confirmed what the FCC had 
decided in Fraport, while extending it to properties that are exclusively 
private.151  
In the second relevant case (“Stadionverbot”), the complainant 
had been excluded permanently from a football stadium because he 
                                                     
146 Id.  
147 In German scholarship it is referred to as the “indirect application of fundamental 
rights” as a translation of the German term “mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte.” 
In the international context however, most refer to it as the “horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights.” For the sake of clarity, the latter will be used throughout the rest of 
the paper.  
148 Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 
BvR 198 (Ger.), https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=51 
[https://perma.cc/NV4D-TNLD]. 
149 Id.  
150 Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18, 2015, 1 
BvQ 25 (Ger.). 
151 In Fraport, the FCC explained that it was not relevant for its decision that the state 
owned the majority of shares of the corporation, but it was hypothetical because Fraport 
was in fact a public company.  
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was suspected to have been a hooligan in the past.152 The FCC declared 
that the defendant, a limited liability corporation running the stadium, 
was obliged to respect the complainant’s fundamental right to 
nondiscrimination under Article 3(1) Basic Law.153 It held that there 
needs to be a substantial reason to exclude someone from an activity 
relevant to life in society, such as major football games.154 Such an 
exclusion would require granting a right to appeal a (private) decision 
when excluding an individual from the public (sphere).155 By doing so, 
the FCC surpassed its broad interpretation of the Public in Fraport 
and Bierdosenflashmob and expanded its protection to the 
opportunity of each individual taking part in societal life.156  
3.Defining the Public in Cyberspace 
The jurisprudence of the FCC shows that it considers the Public 
a space for activities relevant to society, without the requirement of 
core political speech (assuming that watching football games is not a 
political activity). The FCC bases its decision on the way citizens use 
the space to take part in public life and public discourse.157 There is 
currently no decision by the FCC regarding the application of these 
principles in cyberspace. However, it has indicated in Fraport and in 
another decision concerning public broadcasting and the formation of 
public opinion (Rundfunkbeitrag II)158 that there was no apparent 
reason to exempt social media platforms from this principle. In 
general, German scholarship relies on the principle of applying the 
same rules “offline and online.”159 To what extent the FCC will apply 
the horizontal effect of freedom of speech and subsequently restrict a 
platform’s right to moderate user-generated content remains to be 
seen.  
There is a high probability that the FCC will fall back on 
scholarship in social science, just as it previously did with Habermas 
                                                     
152 Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 11, 2018, 1 
BvR 3080, paras. 1–58, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20180411_1bvr308009en.html 
[https://perma.cc/MXC3-2REW].  
153 Id. at para. 41. 
154 Id. at para. 45. 
155 Id. at para. 58. 
156 Amélie Heldt, BVerfG, 11.4.2018 - 1 BvR 3080/09 - Ausstrahlungswirkung des 
allgemeinen Gleichheitssatzes in das Zivilrecht, 2018 NVwZ 813–19 (2018); Christoph 
Smets, Die Stadionverbotsentscheidung des BVerfG und die Umwälzung der 
Grundrechtssicherung auf Private, NVWZ 34–37, 35 (2019). 
157 Id.  
158 Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18, 2018, 1 
BvR 1675 d from http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20180718_1bvr167516en.html 
[https://perma.cc/FE8D-U8FX]. 
159 See 1 BVerfG 699; 1 BVerfG, 1675. 
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and others. The court has never been reluctant to ground its decisions 
on the findings of other disciplines when applicable. While legal 
scholars are still struggling with the issue of content moderation due to 
the lack of clarity about how to transfer constitutional concepts in 
cyberspace, the scholarship in other fields is more advanced. In 
sociology, cyberspace is considered a “new public space for political 
discussion,”160 or even a “new public sphere”:  
To harness the power of the world’s public 
opinion through global media and Internet networks is 
the most effective form of broadening political 
participation on a global scale, by inducing a fruitful, 
synergistic connection between the government-based 
international institutions and the global civil society. 
This multimodal communication space is what 
constitutes the new global public sphere.161  
 
This perception of the Internet as a whole is very broad but 
insightful. Social media platforms have been categorized as “personal 
publics,”162 since they are accessible to the general public but 
categorized in an individual manner for each user. This kind of 
conceptual transfer from the analog to the digital seems quite natural 
when looking at the proportion of communication taking place in 
cyberspace and, in particular, on social media platforms. The 
takeaways for legal scholars are that our doctrinal categories need to be 
more permeable to societal changes. 
C. Interim Conclusion of the Comparative Approach 
From the definition of the Public in German constitutional law 
and its close link to other social sciences, we can draw several 
conclusions regarding the comparison with the U.S. public forum 
doctrine. The two concepts overlap in some aspects, but there is an 
important difference in substance. Formally, fundamental rights are 
applicable to public spaces as state-owned spaces in both jurisdictions. 
Both concepts serve the same purpose and can be considered 
equivalent. As much as the First Amendment rights are protected in 
traditional and designated public forums, the Public in Germany is a 
space where citizens enjoy the protection of their fundamental rights 
(“Grundrechte”) but where the law is applicable nonetheless and might 
restrict their rights by the constitutional proviso.  The designation of a 
place as part of the Public does not grant more freedom than under 
the public forum doctrine because the lawmakers in Germany are 
                                                     
160 Papacharissi, supra note 116, at 22. 
161 Castells, supra note 4, at 90. 
162 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 30. 
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allowed to restrict freedom of speech. The limits of freedom of speech 
under Article 5(2) Basic Law might even be more restrictive than the 
categories of non-protected speech under the First Amendment 
because they may be content related. However, it does not appear that 
the Public has a restrictive effect similar to the public forum doctrine. 
The reason for this conclusion lies in the difference between the two. 
The difference is substantive in nature. In Germany, the Public is 
a space defined by its societal function. For this, the social use of space 
and social norms shall be taken into account at a great scale to 
preserve the societal function for public discourse. As demonstrated, 
the FCC clearly prioritizes the societal function of public spaces, 
especially as a place where public discourse happens, regardless of it 
being private or state-owned property. In doing so, the concept of the 
Public is open to new developments in society. It adapts to where its 
members actually choose to express their opinions and exchange 
ideas. Within this open concept, the limits of free speech in the Public 
are defined by law, whereas under the public forum doctrine there 
cannot be such content-based restrictions. Nonetheless, the Public is 
more prompt to fulfill the need of citizens for an ideal agora—a public 
forum in a non-legal sense because it responds to a reality in society 
and does not need a governmental intervention as the public forum 
doctrine does with its requirements of traditionality and designation. 
While it might seem experimental and audacious to use a 
constitutional comparison, this idea is not completely alien to the First 
Amendment doctrine. As the Court articulated in Red Lion v. Federal 
Communications Commission with regards to the fairness doctrine:  
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance 
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
Government itself or a private licensee. It is the right of 
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which 
is crucial here.163  
In order to guarantee access to the marketplace of ideas, one 
needs to consider adopting a definition of spaces that somehow 
integrates the infrastructure of our deliberative spaces. While public 
space in the analog world is by default the sphere we naturally operate 
in, this no longer applies to the Internet and the dominating social 
media platforms.  
                                                     
163 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1969). 
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IV. WHAT IS SO DIFFERENT ABOUT SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
PLATFORMS? 
Having clarified the main difference between the public forum 
doctrine and its functional equivalent in German scholarship–the 
Public–it is necessary to elaborate on the issues encountered with user-
generated content on social media platforms. What is so different 
about speech on intermediaries that makes it difficult to subsume 
under the current First Amendment theory?  
A. Content Moderation is Necessary 
Some opinions under the First Amendment are protected 
although they might be considered undesirable for the majority, like 
toxic or hate speech.164 In the marketplace of ideas, they will compete 
with other opinions, and, so the rationale goes, the truth will emerge.165 
According to Mill, the argument is important not because it refers to 
the survival theory of truth. Instead, it is the exchange of knowledge 
that leads to the truth: 
Allowing contrary opinions to be expressed is the 
only way to give ourselves the opportunity to reject the 
received opinion when the received opinion is false. A 
policy of suppressing false beliefs will, in fact, suppress 
some true ones, and therefore a policy of suppression 
impedes the search of truth. 166 
While the argument of knowledge enhancement through 
dialogue remains valid, it is possible to question its viability in the 
current social media environment based on user-generated content 
and the engagement it generates.167 User-generated speech is generally 
written and published by users via a post, a tweet, or a comment. It can 
also be recorded and uploaded in a video or audio file. What matters 
here is that it stays—it is not volatile. Speech that is protected by the 
First Amendment within the rationale of the marketplace of ideas 
could potentially cause more harm online than if pronounced on the 
streets or in a park.168 Social media platforms are flooded with speech 
                                                     
164 FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 17 (1982); 
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
882 (1962); see also Mary Ann Franks, Fearless Speech, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 294, 
308 (2018) (arguing the marketplace of ideas is a myth to protect privileged speech). 
165 Id.  
166 SCHAUER, supra note 165, at 19–22. 
167 One might also question its applicability to speakers not aiming at the quest for truth, 
when only spreading content such as spam or when deliberately spreading untrue fact 
statements for misinformation purposes. 
168 Franks, supra note 165, at 310. 
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of different types, and speakers do not always have the intent of 
participating in the quest for truth. Extremists have access to an 
audience they did not reach in times before the social web.169 
Therefore, when the Internet is used “as a vehicle for hate,”170 the 
effects on the public discourse are different and they last because 
people can engage with the content in many ways. These issues are not 
limited to certain platforms. It is still unclear what the consequences of 
online hate speech could be offline, but when specific groups and 
minorities are targeted on social media it could lead to hatred and 
violence in the “real world.”171 
When looking at the reasons why social media platforms need 
content moderation and perhaps also need support from algorithms or 
machine learning, numbers tell more than words: four hundred hours 
of content are uploaded on YouTube per minute.172 On one hand, it 
shows how many people use social media to express themselves and 
how platforms offer people a medium to articulate what was not heard 
in traditional media outlets.173 On the other hand, platforms are a 
display for disturbing, unwanted, and sometimes illegal content that 
users do not want to be confronted with and expect the platforms to 
remove.174 YouTube, for instance, removed 2,398,961 channels from 
October 2018 to December 2018, and the three main reasons for 
removal were (in order of importance): (1) spam, misleading or 
collusive content; (2) nudity or sexually explicit content; and (3) child 
protection.175 At the same time, people would rather engage with 
content that they react to emotionally, such as moral outrage.176 The 
complexity of the connections between platforms and users adds to 
                                                     
169 Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1849 (1995). 
170 NATHAN HALL, HATE CRIME 204 (2013). 
171 Imran Awan, Islamophobia On Social Media: A Qualitative Analysis Of The 
Facebook’s Walls Of Hate, 10 INT'L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 1, 17 (2016). 
172 J. Clement, YouTube – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (June 25, 2019) 
https://www.statista.com/topics/2019/youtube/ [https://perma.cc/9BGC-2TDP] 
(providing statistics since 2015). 
173 Joshua A. Tucker et al., From Liberation to Turmoil: Social Media And Democracy, 
28 J. DEMOCRACY 46, 47 (2017). 
174 Miriam Greis et al., I Can Wait a Minute: Uncovering the Optimal Delay Time for 
Pre-Moderated User-Generated Content on Public Displays, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
32ND ANNUAL ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS - CHI 
’14 1435–38, (2014); TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: 
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE 
SOCIAL MEDIA 8–9 (2018). 
175 GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-
policy/removals [https://perma.cc/SE8J-JXD7]. 
176 M. J. Crockett, Moral Outrage in the Digital Age, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 769, 771 
(2017). 
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the underlying moral and legal questions.177 Content moderation is a 
challenging task, but one that cannot be ignored. As Langvardt rightly 
put it: “[i]magine your email without spam filtering, or your Facebook 
feed if it were populated daily with beheading videos and violent 
pornography.”178 Daily news and recent events, such as the live stream 
of the shooting in New Zealand as the most recent and horrible 
example,179 show that, although users want to be informed (“the 
information society”), they do not wish to be exposed to raw content, 
which in turn has economic consequences for the platforms.180 
If it is agreed that content moderation is a necessity, subsequent 
questions are related to its implementation and enforcement: who 
should moderate what type of content, according to which rules, and 
with the help of which tools? These questions and the answers to them 
are not trivial.181 Although a majority of users are not confronted with 
the problem of moderation–because they do not break the rules–
community guidelines and their enforcement are the backbone of the 
social web. Nonetheless, the platforms’ modus operandi is still very 
opaque.  
This opacity is also linked to the implementation of content 
moderation. Some platforms rely on their users and use peer-based 
moderation systems. Others use a commercial content moderation 
system where moderators are paid to review user-generated content.182 
As the teams of content moderators grew, the task was outsourced to 
places where labor is cheaper; commercial content moderators are 
now working from different parts of the world.183 Problematic content 
(not “manifestly” unlawful or unwanted) will be outsourced to teams 
according to the degree of complexity and/or novelty.184 They will 
review the content, partly flagged by users, on the basis of community 
rules and regulatory frameworks, if applicable.185  
If the decision to take down the content or to withhold the 
account needs more policy or legal input, the case will be escalated to 
                                                     
177 José Van Dijck & Thomas Poell, Understanding Social Media Logic, 1 MEDIA & 
COMM. 2, 11 (2013). 
178 Langvardt, supra note 9, at 1359. 
179 This raises questions as to the way how to moderate live streams, which is another 
issue in itself and cannot be addressed in this paper.  
180 Klonick, supra note 9, at 1625–30. 
181 GILLESPIE, supra note 175, at 9, 17; Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan, KNIGHT 
FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE: EMERGING THREATS SERIES 16 (2018). 
182 Sarah T. Roberts, Content Moderation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIG DATA 1, 1–4 
(Laurie A. Schintler & Connie L. McNeely eds., 2017). 
183 Klonick, supra note 9, at 1640. 
184 Sarah T. Roberts, Commercial Content Moderation: Digital Laborers’ Dirty Work, 
FIMS WESTERN UNIVERSITY MEDIA STUDIES PUBLICATIONS, 2016, at 8–9. 
185 Gillespie, supra note 11, at 262–63. 
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the respective teams. With regard to the large amounts of data 
uploaded on the major platforms, the task of moderating surpasses any 
dimension of what a human reviewer can handle. Platforms, therefore, 
use technology as tools to recognize unwanted content and will 
eventually be a replacement for human reviewers, although so far 
there are no capable systems of that scale.186 
B. If Social Media Platforms Were Considered State Actors 
An increasing number of scholars discuss whether subsuming 
social media platforms under the public function exception and 
turning them into state actors could solve the dilemma.187 According to 
them, social media platforms could be categorized as the public square 
of cyberspace, such as in Marsh v. Alabama, and the First Amendment 
rights of their users should be protected.188 This argument comes not 
only from the platforms offering an infrastructure for communication, 
but also from the fact that platforms gain their value from the 
participation of their users.189 Social media platforms turned 
traditionally passive media consumers into active producers of 
content.190 Without user-generated content, the business model of 
intermediaries would no longer function because they, by definition, 
do not produce their own content. Without their users, they would be 
as empty as a vacant town square, solely animated by billboards. Is the 
risk too big that without such regulation they “will trample on free 
speech values in the relentless pursuit of profit”?191 Should social media 
platforms subsequently be regulated to serve the public interest?  
There are two main reasons why social media platforms cannot, 
and perhaps should not, be subject to First Amendment obligations as 
was the case for the company-town in Marsh v. Alabama. First, making 
social media platforms state actors would result in prohibiting content 
moderation as it is now since the platforms would be subject to the 
strict scrutiny of the First Amendment, making content-based 
                                                     
186 YouTube does claims that, as of 2016, 99.5% of music claims on YouTube were 
matched automatically by Content-ID. See Lyor Cohen, Five Observations From My 
Time at YouTube, OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG, 
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/08/five-observations-from-my-time-at.html 
[https://perma.cc/C7S3-HY3F]. 
187 Benjamin Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of Facebook, 
44 N. M. L. REV. 121, 147, 151 (2014); Daniel Rudofsky, Modern State Action in the 
Age of Big Data, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 777 (2017); Ruthann Robson, The 
Cyber Company Town, FIRST AMENDMENT NEWS 200 (2018). 
188 Jackson, supra note 188; Rudofsky, supra note 188; Robson, supra note 188.  
189 Balkin, supra note 8, at 22. 
190 Tucker et al., supra note 174, at 48. 
191 Balkin, supra note 8, at 22. 
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restrictions of protected speech invalid. That means they would be 
deprived of the right to take down user-generated content on the basis 
of their respective community guidelines and because of what this 
content actually expresses. Second, they are themselves speakers 
under the currently prevailing opinion, which makes a speech-related 
regulation difficult.192 Other options are in discussion at the moment, 
namely breaking up the biggest companies in an anti-trust interest.193 
This would have consequences on the underlying business model and 
prevent companies from using their users’ data to fuel the attention 
economy.194 This, in turn, would make it less attractive for the 
platforms to algorithmically push hateful or shocking content on top of 
newsfeeds, perhaps leading to a decrease of that type of content. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the next administration takes 
action in that direction. 
C. At Least Partly: Social Media Profiles as Designated Public 
Forum 
While the Court is reluctant to expand the company-town 
analogy to other private actors, there has been a noticeable change at 
the level of district courts with regard to digital forums, at least in 
part.195 For instance, the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of 
New York recently subsumed President Donald J. Trump’s Twitter 
feed as a designated public forum, and the decision was confirmed by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in July 2019.196 In this 
case, filed by the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia 
University, the Court was asked “to consider whether a public official 
may, consistent with the First Amendment, “block” a person from his 
Twitter account in response to the political views that person has 
expressed, and whether the analysis differs because that public official 
is the President of the United States.”197 The answer to both questions 
was no. The Court considered “whether forum doctrine can be 
appropriately applied to several aspects of the @realDonaldTrump 
                                                     
192 Langvardt, supra note 9, at 1364; Klonick, supra note 9, at 1664. 
193 Mitch Stoltz & Shahid Buttar, Antitrust Enforcement Needs to Evolve for the 21st 
Century, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 27, 2019) 
https://www.eff.org/de/deeplinks/2019/02/antitrust-enforcement-needs-evolve-21st-
century [https://perma.cc/6MML-57YB]. 
194 Van Dijck and Poell, supra note 178, at 6. 
195 Robson, supra note 188. 
196 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 
226 (2nd Cir. 2019).  
197  Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549. 
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account rather than the account as a whole”198 and came to the 
conclusion, that, yes, the tweets sent by the President qualified as a 
designated public forum because the requirements for a governmental 
forum were met.199 To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on 
externalities, such as the description of the account (the 
@realDonaldTrump account is presented as being “registered to 
Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the United States of America, 
Washington, D.C.’”) and on the actual usage to communicate policies 
and appointments via this account.200  
This decision can serve as an indicator but should not be 
overestimated.201 Categorizing the U.S. President as a state actor and 
subsequently subject to First Amendment limitations is not 
overwhelmingly surprising and only notable because it was embedded 
in a social media setting. However, it shows that it is not sufficient to 
invoke private property as a “shield” from any protection of speech. 
Following the reasoning of the Court in Knight Institute v. Trump, 
parts of a privately-owned infrastructure, such as social media 
platforms, can be opened as designated public forums and provide 
appropriate protection of free speech. In similar cases, users were 
blocked from accessing government officials’ social media profiles, or 
their comments were deleted.  
Governmental communication via private digital actors, such as 
social media platforms, is an area of research in itself. It begs the 
question of government officials using the whole “toolbox” offered by 
social media platforms, including preventing citizens from interacting 
via their Facebook pages or Twitter profiles. Because Facebook pages, 
for example, do not offer the ability to turn off the commenting 
option, government officials sometimes struggle to find the appropriate 
reaction to people contacting them over this medium. Researchers 
found that some public figures prefer to hide comments than to delete 
them because of the users’ reactions.202 Here again, there is a constant 
dilemma between the advantages of fostering communication between 
lawmakers and the people, and the downsides of state actors 
potentially circumventing First Amendment restraints when they use 
non-state actors for communicative purposes.  
V. SOLUTION STATEMENT 
                                                     
198 Id. at 566. 
199 Id. at 575. 
200 Id. at 567. 
201 See Yemini, supra note 26, at 1179. 
202 Karoline Andrea Ihlebæk, Bente Kalsnes, Hiding hate speech – a study of political 
parties’ use of Facebook’s toolbox for comment moderation (forthcoming 2020–21).  
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 In light of the issues encountered by the public forum doctrine 
and the current developments of online speech, this article proposes a 
solution based on the learnings from the comparative approach. 
Representative democracy needs spaces for deliberation where citizens 
can express political opinions and exchange views.203 The perspective 
proposed below also builds on the fact that social media platforms are 
governed not only by legislative rules but also largely by social norms,204 
similar to life in analog public spaces. Instead of holding on to 
doctrinal categories from the past, the principles guiding the 
application of constitutional norms can be adapted to societal 
changes.205 
A. Necessity for a New Public Forum Category? 
A goal of comparative law can be to change perspectives and 
perhaps to question dogmas that seem at first hand irrevocable. When 
looking at the public forum doctrine, the strict separation between 
public and private is legitimate because it restricts governmental action 
on free speech. The perception of governmental power is very 
different in the U.S. than in Germany, which is why this article does 
not argue for a simple transfer of the FCC’s holdings to U.S. 
jurisprudence. However, the reasoning behind the holdings in Fraport, 
Bierdosenflashmob, or Stadionverbot can be helpful. The German 
constitutional jurisprudence is highly influenced by Habermas and his 
model of a deliberative democracy,206 which elevates the social 
dimension on a higher level than in the U.S. where the priority of an 
individual’s liberty is in line with the First Amendment’s principle of 
autonomy. There is nevertheless some common ground between both 
approaches, as the Court’s decision Packingham v. North Carolina 
shows.  
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court stressed that the 
importance of analog public forums had not diminished (“[e]ven in 
the modern era, these places are still essential venues for public 
gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn 
and inquire”), but that new places for people to listen and to speak 
have emerged.207 The Court recognized the central role that social 
                                                     
203 Bodnar, supra note 52, at 2095. 
204 Tal Z Zarsky, Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of Social Media, 35 
PACE L. REV. 154, 157 (2014). 
205 Wilson Ray Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic 
Choice, 34 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 1379, 1394 (2006); Waldman, supra note 92, at 
430. 
206 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (1989). 
207 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).  
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media plays in the daily lives of average citizens and how barring 
access to these platforms constitutes a severe restriction: 
By prohibiting sex offenders from using those 
websites, North Carolina with one broad stroke bars 
access to what for many are the principal sources for 
knowing current events, checking ads for employment, 
speaking and listening in the modern public square, 
and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human 
thought and knowledge.208 These websites can provide 
perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a 
private citizen to make his or her voice heard.209  
 
By calling social media platforms the “modern public square” 
(and explicitly naming Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter in its 
holdings), the Court acknowledged the reality of how most people use 
the Internet and communicate digitally.  
This decision confirmed what has been discussed for many years 
amongst scholars arguing in favor of solutions that could serve both 
free speech and the platforms’ rights, including the freedom to 
contract. Regulating social media platforms might not be possible 
because of the platforms’ own rights as speakers, but governmental 
action could include providing more opportunities for public 
communication.210 Courts could resolve the tension between users’ and 
platforms’ free speech rights by prioritizing users’ rights over those of 
companies.211 This could be underlined by the argument that there is a 
need to “preserve a free society.”212 Other scholars invoke a more 
affirmative protection of speech, similar to the Californian model, “in 
recognizing the right of the public to engage in expressive conduct, 
wherever the public freely gathers.”213  
B. A New Public Forum Category? 
In this last part, this article presents an idea of a “social” public 
forum based on the findings above. By combining the problem of the 
public forum doctrine that this article has called a “dilemma” with the 
comparative analysis and the challenges emerging out of online 
                                                     
208 Id. at 1737. 
209 Id.  
210 Fee, supra note 63, at 615. 
211 Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech Is Better, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1643 (1998). 
212 LARRY W. BEEFERMAN, IMAGES OF THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: RESOLVING THE 
PARADOX OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 80 (1996). 
213 Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, 
and the Promise of Pruneyard Note, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 562 (2004). 
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communication, it shows that the public forum doctrine is not 
equipped for speech expressed in the digital sphere.  
1. Connecting the Dots 
The public forum doctrine was developed to delimit and 
consequently to guarantee places where citizens could speak freely, 
and it is out of the question that public forums are necessary to enjoy 
the freedom of speech. They must meet requirements defined by the 
doctrine and be consistent with the purpose of the place.214 Only 
traditional or designated public forums are subject to strict scrutiny 
under the First Amendment; hence, a governmental act is a 
prerequisite. In other constitutional traditions, such as Germany, a 
space for free speech can also be defined by social norms or by their 
social function for democracy. If a place is open to the general public 
for the purpose of communication, it might be considered part of “the 
public.” This allows more flexibility with regard to the spaces where 
people actually meet and speak, such as social media platforms.  
In the U.S., the lack of adaptability is, strictly speaking, not only 
due to the public forum doctrine but also to the state action doctrine. 
As long as the terms outlining which action can be recognized as state 
action remain the same, no further exception will be added. As a 
result, social media platforms are not state actors (and only to an 
extremely limited extent designated public forums), which allows them 
to moderate speech. On the other hand, they are not bound by 
fundamental rights, although their role in online communication is 
decisive, and the necessity of having access to the Internet and to 
intermediaries has been acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
2. A “Social” Public Forum  
Combining these findings, this article proposes a new category of 
public forums which would merge the right of platforms to moderate 
speech with the First Amendment freedoms that are necessary to use 
the intermediaries’ services in a reasonable manner. It would be 
applied by courts when interpreting a platform’s terms and services—
that is when users bring an action against a take-down decision in a 
case of content moderation. The role of the judiciary will be crucial to 
address the challenges described in this article. Judicial review has 
already proven to provide answers to some of the questions raised. 
Moreover, judicial review allows a dialogue between courts and 
scholars that can be particularly fruitful because it offers entry points 
for tradeoffs and flexibility. The idea of an additional category within 
the public forum doctrine is therefore based on the observation that 
                                                     
214 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009). 
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while the hands of legislative power are tied, the judiciary is playing an 
important role in the process of defining the responsibilities of social 
media platforms.215 
Courts can strike a new path by proposing a category of the 
public forum that could potentially overcome doctrinal obstacles. 
Although a new category in the doctrine implies a judicial review in the 
first place, the chances are high that the jurisprudence will develop a 
spillover effect and find its way into the internal content moderation 
policies of large social media companies.216 The doctrine can only be 
truly effective if companies apply it to more than just the single case 
that was litigated.  
 The definition of this type of “social” public forum could be 
based on the concept of the Public in German constitutional 
scholarship, as well as on that of the public sphere, and on the 
holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court.217 It would need to fulfill the 
following criteria: (1) be a digital space open to the general public; (2) 
serve the purpose of digital communication; and (3) be essential to the 
public discourse in the digital age. Publicly accessible or open to the 
general public means there are no special requirements for the person 
registering. Requiring registration is not in itself sufficient to dismiss 
the criterium. If a platform fulfills these criteria it would not be such a 
social public forum as a whole. To be more concrete, the publicly 
accessible part of a social media platform, such as its newsfeed with 
public posts, would still be subject to the platform’s terms and 
conditions, including its community guidelines regarding unwanted 
user-generated content. Additionally, the platform would need to 
consider the speaker’s free speech rights if the content is protected 
speech under the First Amendment and does not fall in the categories 
of unprotected speech. The review process for this type of unwanted 
but not illegal user-generated content would require a more balanced 
approach. The First Amendment restraints would only be applicable 
to the parts described above and only to a certain extent. 
One of the main challenges in this context is the question of how 
we draw the line between private and public when it comes to 
communication on platforms. To address this, we can rely on 
jurisprudence but not completely. For example, in Packingham v. 
                                                     
215 Cf. Wu, supra note 89, at 23 (considering new laws or regulations that would probably 
be unconstitutional according to the First Amendment). 
216 Practical examples can already be found on larger platforms such as YouTube which 
claims to balance four freedoms in their content moderation process, namely: freedom 
of speech, freedom of information, freedom to act, and freedom to belong. See 
Youtube About, https://www.youtube.com/intl/en/yt/about/ [https://perma.cc/5FEZ-
2MV7]. 
217 See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
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North Carolina, the Court has somehow overlooked the necessity for 
more specific guidance.218 All platforms named in this decision were 
summarized as a “modern town square” without acknowledging the 
different services and functions they offer.219 This gap could be filled by 
the social public forum category by applying the criteria presented 
here. Accordingly, the scope of application would include public posts, 
public events, public groups, and public pages of businesses that are 
visible to all users of the platform, in continuity with the marketplace 
analogy.  
The parts used in Packingham as a “public modern square” with 
public announcements would be considered such a social public 
forum. Because of the private legal nature of the platform, its users, 
and their relationship, the platform would still be allowed to moderate 
content but in a way that would be more transparent and respectful of 
individual rights.220 This hybrid category between public and nonpublic 
forums would only be applicable to platforms of a certain size at the 
courts’ discretion. Just as the creation of “the Public” as described in 
the German cases requires a space to be open to the general public, to 
be designed for people to communicate, and to be used as a host for 
public discourse, the social public forum would only be open when 
meeting all the requirements. This would prevent overburdening small 
platforms that are only used to communicate about specific topics or 
are not open to everybody.  
Another point that requires clarification is whether social 
platforms could be required to provide equal access to their services 
within the scope of application and whether it should be somehow 
guaranteed. They could, for example, be subject to the Equal Access 
Act of 1948 (EAA), which is a federal law applicable to schools 
receiving federal aid and opening limited public forums for non-
curriculum related activities.221 The EAA states that equal access must 
be provided to other interest groups when allowing a club or an 
association to use the school’s premises for their activities.  
The EAA was ruled constitutional in Board of Education of the 
Westside Community v. Mergens.222 In this case, the Court held that a 
group of students could form a religious study group and hold their 
meetings in the school because the school opened limited public 
forums.223 Formally, social media platforms are not subject to the EAA 
because they are neither education facilities receiving federal aid nor 
are they somehow governmental, which means they do not open 
                                                     
218 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
219 Id. at 1732. 
220 Id. 
221  20 U.S.C.  4017 (1984). 
222 Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
223 Id. at 291.  
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public forums as state actors do. One could consider transferring this 
principle to social media platforms by requiring them to allow all 
registrants to their services access to the forum created or to allow the 
creation of user groups without any limitation if a similar group has 
been created before. The function called “groups” can, for example, 
be found on Facebook. Any user can create a group, name it, and 
invite others to join. The founder can decide what level of privacy the 
group should have: public, closed, or secret. Public groups, their 
names, and their respective descriptions, as well as public posts, are 
available to everyone visiting Facebook without being logged in. The 
names of members and administrators of public groups are only 
visible to Facebook users.224 If provisions similar to the EAA were 
applicable to such Facebook groups, users would still be allowed to 
create secret groups, the most private form of group. It would, 
however, require Facebook to treat the public groups equally.  
There are nevertheless limits to the idea of a social public forum 
within platforms: the content moderation would still happen according 
to the standards set by the platforms’ policies. Only in specific cases 
could a court rule that the take-down decision or the exclusion of users 
by the platform was not respectful enough of its role as a host of public 
discourse. There are only a few exemptions to the broad scope of 
protection of the free speech clause, and platforms should be able to 
limit user-generated content beyond these few categories of 
unprotected speech. It will be the judges’ task to elaborate what the 
threshold for speech protection under the social public forum will 
be.225 They will have to form case law for the digital age in which the 
offline limits between public and private spaces disintegrate. Hate 
speech and misinformation are probably categories of unwanted 
content that can be sanctioned, especially when directed at individuals. 
Other cases could be less obvious, such as content categories 
forbidden by a platform’s community standards but protected by the 
First Amendment and sometimes not harmful per se. Nudity is an 
example of content that might not be suitable to all ages but is not 
harmful per se.226 The same argument could be made for other types of 
                                                     
224 Facebook, What are the privacy settings for groups?, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/220336891328465#What-are-the-privacy-options-for-
groups [https://perma.cc/YB28-Z6AN]. 
225 For examples where courts had to decide similar kinds of disputes, see Keefe v. 
Adams, 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016) (addressing student’s expulsion from professional 
school based on a Facebook comment: “stupid bitch”); Hunt v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of N. M., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1251 (D.N.M. 2018) (discussing school punishment 
for publishing political views on Facebook). 
226 Amélie Heldt, #NSFW? Be Yourself But Don’t Undress, DIGITAL SOCIETY BLOG 
(Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.hiig.de/en/nsfw-be-yourself-but-dont-undress 
[https://perma.cc/W36E-5X33]. 
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content including political speech which enjoys special protection 
under the First Amendment, especially in a public forum.227  
Then again, political speech is probably the most difficult 
category to delimit from others—what is political and what is not? Even 
if jurisprudence and scholarship on how to define political speech, as 
opposed to commercial or ordinary speech, exists, digitization has 
generated new forms of expressions and trends in political activism. 
The latter include memes (“an amusing or interesting item (such as a 
captioned picture or video) or genre of items that is spread widely 
online especially through social media”228), pictures of naked body parts 
to advocate for gender equality, and other forms of text or images 
sometimes combined. The imitation of cultural codes to convey a 
political message has become an important part of Internet culture, 
just as a caricature in print media is more than a drawing.229 Not only 
are these new communicative conduits open for external creative 
input, they are also more participatory than traditional media outlets 
and in a sense more democratic.230 Keeping in mind the ideal of a 
deliberative democracy, it is of high priority to take digital forms of 
expression seriously. This includes being aware of the potentially 
political messages they contain as well as their impact on the digital 
sphere. Drawing the line(s) between different types of speech, such as 
political, entertainment, satire, and commercial, is a task that courts 
have been performing, which is another reason to plead for a way 
forward that includes a judicial review. 
This idea of a social public forum should not be misunderstood 
as a form of “public use” of private property.231 Although this article 
uses terms such as property and space to elaborate on the idea of a 
new public forum on social media that moves closer to the public 
sphere, this domain-related vocabulary is not intended to advocate 
eminent domain on social media platforms. Nonetheless, this article 
would push back on the arguments brought against the use of private 
shopping malls and transferred on social media platforms. Shopping 
                                                     
227 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
228 “Meme”, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-
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229 Lorenz Grünewald-Schukalla & Georg Fischer, Überlegungen zu einer textuellen 
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230 Kate M. Miltner, “There’s No Place for Lulz on LOLCats”: The Role of Genre, 
Gender, and Group Identity in the Interpretation and Enjoyment of an Internet Meme, 
19 FIRST MONDAY (2014). 
231 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). 
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malls are considered as open to the general public, even if they have 
opening hours, especially in the U.S. where shops are usually open 
every day. A space open to all customers cannot be considered closed 
to public use simply based on opening hours.232 In the same way, an 
invitation to visit a neighbor does not make her house or garden a 
public space, allowing someone to use it according to their own 
wishes.233 Users are capable of differentiating between private and 
public spheres within a platform, such as a private messenger-service 
and a public post appearing in a platform’s newsfeed. The size 
argument, on the other hand, is more valid:234 A small social media 
platform might, but does not have to be, such a social public forum if 
the number of users is relatively small. This was addressed in the 
scope of application of the social public forum.  
3. Potential Pitfalls 
a. The Problem of Scale 
Of course, there could be a problem of scale: it is unlikely that all 
cases of disagreement about content moderation can be decided by 
national courts, at least in a satisfying timespan. There are two answers 
to that allegation. One is the spillover effect which has already been 
described and can be witnessed in some cases that arise in relation to 
public outcry about platforms’ role in, for example, election 
campaigns. Platforms are increasingly allowing internal remedy 
mechanisms which can be interpreted as a reaction to the pressure of 
governmental regulation and user mistrust. Some are even actively 
asking governments to regulate platforms, such as Facebook and 
Microsoft, perhaps to be held less responsible by users when in fact 
there are already rules they could refer to.  
So far, companies are not directly bound by human rights as 
states are, but there are standards for companies, such as the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs).235 According to the UNGPs, private actors must avoid 
infringing on individual rights and be aware of their potential influence 
on human rights.236 This principle could, for example, intend to 
implement as far as possible the UNGP’s framework “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” to areas such as freedom of speech and information. 
The second response to the aforementioned allegation is that 
                                                     
232 Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v 
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platforms also use the argument of scale to reject access to remedies. 
One should refrain from dismissing a proposed solution on the 
grounds of lacking feasibility—even more, if it is used by both sides. 
Again, the proposed solution should not necessarily be applicable to 
small-sized platforms (although it could), but certain minimum 
standards would not be overburdening for services with a large 
number of users.237 
b. Consequences for Publishers 
When making sense of the digital sphere and the applicable legal 
concepts, we often fall back on ideas and rules we know from the 
analog world. It is often asked why social media platforms are not 
treated as traditional mass media. Legally speaking, intermediaries are 
exempt from editorial responsibility under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.238 Furthermore, they cannot be held 
liable for restricting content “whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.”239 The proposed solution could, therefore, 
fit into the current framework of intermediary liability, such as a 
different regime than publishers.  
However, the question should also be asked the other way 
around: if platforms are obliged to put back user content due to their 
categorization as a hybrid form of a public forum, would that also be 
applicable to traditional media? Facebook, for instance, has been 
under scrutiny for playing an ambiguous role when it comes to 
curating content and for eventually becoming more similar to a 
publisher than it claims to be.240 One could wonder if traditional media 
have lost some of their editorial power through digitization and apply 
this reasoning to them. Hence, they would also offer a similar type of 
social public forum and could be forced to publish.  
Although the idea is worth mentioning, social media platforms 
and traditional mass media are so fundamentally different that they 
should not be treated equally. Social media platforms rely on user-
generated content and provide a medium for every user regardless of 
their personality, which is fundamentally different from newspapers 
and broadcasting stations. When it comes to the comment section of 
traditional media on social media platforms, it would be conceivable to 
consider an additional forum within the social public forum. In 
practice, user-generated content in the publicly accessible part of the 
platform would be moderated by the platform’s moderation team 
whereas the comment section below an article posted by a newspaper 
                                                     
237 Pasquale, supra note 9, at 500–01. 
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may be subject to their own moderation rules and overseen by their 
community manager. This raises a whole other set of questions as to 
the areas of responsibility for different actors within this new social 
public forum category.   
c. How to Adapt to Changes 
The proposed solution relies on the premise that most social 
media platforms offer the possibility for every user to make a 
somehow public appearance and to share their content with the whole 
network.241 The concrete forms vary between platforms, but there is a 
similar idea of the “modern town square” in the form of posts as well 
as events and groups that can, in theory, be seen by all users. How 
flexible would the social public forum be to changes if platforms 
change formally and/or substantively? What if social media platforms 
turn to a different model? To be more specific, given the difficulty to 
moderate speech due to the formal requirements of a public forum, 
what if platforms remove the newsfeed? Facebook has recently 
announced it would move to a more private type of service.242 In its 
pledge to “privacy,” the world’s largest social media platform would 
focus more on one-on-one communication and move away from the 
model of users contributing to the newsfeed.243  
If Facebook introduces a more private model of social media 
platform, does the new category of a social public forum become 
obsolete? Not really. The discussion about the online public sphere 
and how to subsume it under preexisting legal concepts does not 
minimize its importance. Changing the service delivered by platforms 
is not an answer to these questions, only a divergence. Whether it is in 
“newsfeeds,” “groups,” “channels,” or other forms of social networks, 
platforms connect people and enable communication. Giving up that 
type of service would mean restricting the communication between 
users to a one-on-one communication. Subsequently, social media 
platforms would eventually resemble telecommunication providers 
and be subject to, if not the same, at least very similar rules.  
A substantive change by social media platforms would bear more 
consequences. If they change their purpose by, for example, moving to 
a model describable as a theme-based communication platform, the 
                                                     
241 Nota bene: every user sees a different algorithmic sortation of content and has a 
different user experience. Nevertheless, content that was published without privacy 
limitations is visible to all if not geo-blocked by the platform.  
242 Mike Isaac, Facebook Unveils Redesign as It Tries to Move Past Privacy Scandals, 
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consequences would be more significant than after a formal change in 
the form to communication. If private actors, like a club or an 
association, choose a topic, they cannot be forced to deal with other 
topics because of a possible violation of their own First Amendment 
rights.244 The obligation to deal with a certain topic is a typical content-
based regulation that is not allowed under the free speech clause.245 A 
reading club with an emphasis on Simone de Beauvoir cannot be 
forced to discuss Marvel comics or Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings.  
With regard to social networks, a substantive change could, for 
instance, mean that platforms no longer strive to form global 
communities and eventually connect the whole world. Instead, they 
would limit their scope to topics and build communities around these 
topics. Accordingly, they would no longer reflect the modern town 
square because they would not be as general as before and would be 
less bound by their users’ First Amendment rights. In theory, a change 
to a platform model with a substantive focus would correlate with a 
reduced, if not restrained, application of the social public forum. Even 
though the platform would still fulfill the criteria of the category’s 
scope of application, it would be under the condition that users want 
to communicate about that specific topic. The platform could, 
therefore, limit the users’ communication adequately. In practice, the 
substantive focus would need to be narrow enough to effectively limit 
user-generated content. It would need to be a network no longer 
fulfilling the following generic definition: “[s]ocial media allows users 
to gain access to information and communicate with one another 
about it on any subject that might come to mind.”246 A platform like 
LinkedIn that solely promotes itself as a professional network would 
still fall under the public social forum because the topic of work is very 
broad.247 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The public forum doctrine is not entirely apt to respond to 
contemporary issues such as the one of content moderation on 
platforms that are perceived as a public space by users but do not fall 
under the definition of a First Amendment’s public forum.248 The shift 
from analog space to cyberspace entails a shortening in the protection 
intended to be provided by the public forum doctrine.  
                                                     
244 IDES ET AL., supra note 29, at 414. 
245 Id. at 354. 
246 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
247 The Supreme Court in Packingham also mentioned LinkedIn as one of the platforms 
constituting the modern town square, although LinkedIn has a self-defined substantive 
focus as a professional and work-related network. See generally, id.  
248 Nunziato, supra note 10, at 1161. 
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This shift is a significant obstacle for speakers, particularly when 
their speech is within the First Amendment’s scope of protection and 
not necessarily violating community standards. When the 
interpretation of such user-generated content is left to the moderators’ 
discretion, under the principle of taking it down when in doubt, there 
is high risk of over blocking.249 Exploring foreign concepts of “the 
Public” (such as in German constitutional jurisprudence) helps to 
think beyond classical categories and to evaluate the necessity of a new 
way to go for the public forum doctrine. In the present case, the 
conclusions from the functional comparison even seem to support the 
principles of First Amendment theory when referring to the social 
function of free speech.250 It might also be reminiscent of Roosevelt’s 
second bill of rights project, where he advocated a more social 
perception of fundamental rights.251 The latter should serve not only as 
a protection of liberty against the state but also as a duty to preserve 
social cohesion.252 Given the offline consequences of harmful online 
speech, such as extremism and terror, we need more clarity about the 
role of public discourse in our society. 
What are the basic points to bear in mind when thinking of a 
deliberative space online? This article shows that one cannot simply 
import traditional concepts into a new socio-technical infrastructure 
without adapting the doctrine to a certain extent. In order to enable a 
space for more speech without violating the rights of private actors, 
such as platforms, the way forward is to ask ourselves how to build a 
system that preserves democratic principles. It is necessary to preserve 
the checks and balances of the current legal framework, maintaining a 
clear separation of powers. This mainly translates into an ongoing 
discussion of the notion of power beyond the separation of private and 
public.  
If we limit this debate to intermediary liability, there is a serious 
risk of overlooking the intertwinement of state actors and non-state 
actors in the context of online speech. Legal innovation through 
judicial review can combine the social reality of concrete cases, the 
voices of academia, and the flexibility of a case-by-case approach. Ad 
hoc doctrinal application might not be desirable in terms of legal 
uncertainty;253 however, it does provide a more open framework than 
                                                     
249 Josh Constine, Instagram Now Demotes Vaguely ‘Inappropriate’ Content, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 10, 2019) http://social.techcrunch.com/2019/04/10/instagram-
borderline [https://perma.cc/3KJC-CJMB]. 
250 Emerson, supra note 165, at 882–84. 
251 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (Basic Books ed., 2004).  
252 Id.; COREY L. BRETTSCHNEIDER, GOVERNMENTAL POWERS: CASES AND READINGS 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Wolters Klewer Law & 
Business ed. 2014). 
253 See Black Jr., supra note 60, at 95; Tushnet, supra note 60, at 80. 
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regulatory interventions by the state. All in all, adding a hybrid 
category to the public forum doctrine—a social public forum—could 
help to overcome the current obstacles. It would not require a 
regulatory act and could be integrated into the existing public forum 
doctrine, leaving up to the courts’ discretion when to apply it.  
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